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ABSTRACT: The relative absence of formal provision for
the resolution of conflict among organizations in the American
legal system results in each one controlling others in the
system through constraints on the processing of people and
information as inputs to their own organization. This paper
focuses on the specific case where the courts attempt to control
the behavior of the police through the exclusionary rule,
particularly as set forth in the Miranda decision. Data on
interrogations of suspects in field patrol settings show that
arresting officers always had evidence apart from the inter-
rogation itself as a basis for arrest. It would appear that the
introduction of Miranda-type warnings into field settings would
have relatively little effect on the liability of suspects to crimi-
nal charges, particularly in felony cases, assuming current
police behavior with respect to arrest.
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HE legal system in American so-ciety is a loosely articulated set of
subsystems. Where the criminal law is
concerned, the subsystems are law en-
forcement, the public prosecutor, legal
counsel, the judiciary, and corrections.
The legitimacy and administrative re-
sponsibility for any of them may derive
from different government jurisdictions,
giving rise to problems of mutual co-
optation and control. Nowhere within
the legal system is there formal pro-
vision for organizational subordination
of one subsystem to the other so that
decisions in any one subsystem can be
directly and effectively enforced in
others by administrative or other or-
ganizational sanctions. The law itself,
rather than organizational implementa-
tion, generally governs such relation-
ships.
Though each subsystem is highly de-
pendent upon the others and they are
hierarchically organized so that the out-
puts of one become the inputs of an-
other, each is more highly integrated
around its focal orientation than around
an orientation that is common to the
legal system. This paper focuses on
conflict over legitimacy of means that
arises between the police in the law
enforcement system and the appellate
courts in the judicial system. It ex-
amines a current controversy over the
legality of means of interrogation. The
conduct of interrogation by the police
has received much attention since the
Escobedo and Miranda decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.1
All subsystems within the legal sys-
tem may be regarded in organizational
terms as primarily information- and
people-processing systems. The law-en-
forcement system is the major origi-
nating point for both people and infor-
mation about them as they are proc-
essed in the legal system. Given the
loose articulation of units in the system
and their divergent ends, conflict arises
as to the means which each organiza-
tion may use to achieve its immediate
organizational ends vis-h-vis those of
the legal system qua legal system.
PROCEDURAL CONFLICT IN THE
LEGAL SYSTEM
Conflict between the judicial and the
law-enforcement subsystems is, in a
broad sense, endemic in the legal sys-
tem, particularly conflict between the
appellate courts and the police. The
judicial system, especially its higher
courts, is organized to articulate a moral
order-a system of values and norms-
rather than an order of behavior in
public and private places. By contrast,
the police are organized to articulate
a behavior system-to maintain law and
order. Theirs is a system of organiza-
tional control. Nowhere is this more
apparent than in their processing of
people and information.
Indeed, the justices of our highest
courts and the police officer on patrol
represent almost opposite poles in their
processing of people and information.
The officer in routine patrol is prin-
cipally oriented toward maintenance of
behavior systems and is least likely to
interpret the law as he exercises dis-
cretion in making decisions. By con-
trast, a justice of the Supreme Court is
least likely to see organizational and
behavioral consequences of his decisions
and most likely to interpret the law in
terms of a moral order.
The police organization bears the
major responsibility for implicating per-
sons in the criminal legal system and
for gathering information that the pub-
lic prosecutor may effectively process in
the courts. While the information for a
case that may be prosecuted effectively
in the courts is governed by rules of
1 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ;
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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evidence and procedure, the organiza-
tional emphasis of the police is upon
generating information that links a per-
son with a criminal event or helps to
maintain public order. The appellate
courts, however, control the criteria for
admissibility of evidence including the
legitimacy (legality) of the means for
securing it. Their criteria are estab-
lished by the moral system of the law
rather than in terms of organizational
criteria of effective enforcement of the
law.
To be sure, the appellate courts are
enmeshed in the balancing of interests
and in the pursuit of such abstract ends
as the protection of society and the
maintenance of justice. Both ends and
interests, however, get defined in terms
of a moral order. Where judicial inter-
pretation is concerned, the courts may
respond to behavioral and organiza-
tional changes, but within the confines
of articulating a moral order that is the
law. Where law enforcement is con-
cerned, the police may respond to be-
havioral and organizational changes,
but within the confines of organizational
control of behavior.
There is an important sense in which
the relevance of information to law en-
forcement differs from its relevance to
the courts. Again, this arises from the
variation in their functions within the
legal system. For the police, the end
of securing information is to increase
their knowledge of crimes and the solu-
tion of crimes by the arrest of persons.
Along with the public prosecutor, they
have an investment in &dquo;making it stick,&dquo;
but their organizational concern is less
for the legitimacy of means than for
the rather immediate end of enforcing
behavior standards. For the appellate
courts, information is relevant to the
body of the law; it is an issue of law
rather than of organizational effective-
ness.
Despite a spate of scientific criminology
for developing laboratory evidence by
police organizations and despite a spate
of rules regarding such evidence, the
core of information for both systems
remains that secured and presented by
oral statement. For the police, as for
the courts, the oral interview is crucial
in supplying information. Whether dig-
nified by names such as interrogation or
testimony, it is a structure of question
and answer in social encounters, be it
the private or public setting, the station
house or court room, the office or
chambers. Until recently, however, the
procedures for eliciting such oral infor-
mation, whether by the police, lawyers,
or judicial officers, have received rela-
tively little formal attention.
Admittedly, there is a considerable
body of rules governing the admissibil-
ity of evidence in trial proceedings.
Such rules generally relate to the con-
duct of matters within the immediate
jurisdiction of the court, such as the
admissibility of hearsay during the trial.
Giv.en the loose articulation of sub-
systems within the legal system and the
absence of any formal central authority
to enforce conformity across subsys-
tems, the major means any subsystem
has for controlling others in the legal
system is through its own operating
organization. For the police, control
of other subsystems is exercised through
the discretionary decision to arrest.
For the courts, it is exercised through
the control of the admissibility of
evidence, particularly by means of the
exclusionary rule. Miranda is a case
in point.
When the court establishes criteria
for admissibility, however, it does so
within the context of a specific legal
issue rather than in terms of a generic
legal or organizational problem. Thus,
Miranda does not come to terms with
the general issue of the interview as a
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mode of gaining information, nor of the
role of interrogation, for that matter.
Rather, the decision states criteria for
the admissibility of admissions or con-
fessions, criteria that relate to the rights
of persons with respect to self-incrimi-
nation.
Like the police, the behavioral sci-
entist is oriented toward behavior in
organizational systems. In designing
behavioral research that has relevance
to legal issues, not unlike the police he
confronts problems of operationalizing
legal concepts. This becomes apparent
when one attempts to undertake re-
search with respect to the legal issues
relating to interrogation, particularly if
one regards recent decisions as early
cases in a potential series of decisions
that may have relevance to information
gained through questioning of suspects.
The Miranda v. Arizona decision of
the United States Supreme Court makes
it obligatory for police officers, inter
alia, to apprise suspects of their con-
stitutional rights before &dquo;in-custody in-
terrogation&dquo; if the admission gained
from the interrogation is to be admis-
sible as evidence. It is far from clear
when an &dquo;in-custody&dquo; situation legally
begins, when questioning becomes in-
terrogation, or when information be-
comes an admission. Furthermore,
from an organizational point of view,
the limiting of police practices by con-
trolling admissibility of evidence se-
cured through &dquo;in-custody interroga-
tion&dquo; within an interrogation room of a
station-house logically opens the way to
greater use of interrogation in field set-
tings. Moreover, for the behavioral
scientist, there is a general question of
the kinds of information available for
processing in the system apart from
interrogation. Would the elimination
of all questioning within in-custody situ-
ations eliminate a major source of in-
formation ? These are difficult matters
for operationalization if they are to
have relevance to questions at issue in
the legal system.
This paper reports selected findings
pertaining to interrogations in en-
counters between police officers and sus-
pects in patrol settings. For purposes
of the field study, an interrogation was
defined operationally as any question-
ing of a probing nature that went
beyond mere identification of the person
and that led to defining the person as
a suspect or offender. The field patrol
officer, unlike the detective or officer
who interrogates in the now stereotyped
setting of the interrogation room at the
station, must use. an interview or ques-
tioning to define the situation and the
participants in it. Both the assertion
of some authority and the development
of facts are essential elements in such
a process.2 2
Furthermore, in field patrol work,
the officer usually encounters suspects
in the situation where an event is pre-
sumed to have occurred and generally
at a point relatively immediate to the
event itself. By way of contrast, the
detective usually encounters a suspect
at a time and place removed from the
occurrence of the event--either at the
station where the suspect has been
brought for questioning or in a public
or private place where he seeks infor-
mation from the suspected person. In-
terrogation or questioning thus may
play a somewhat different role for the
two types of officers. Yet in both cases,
a central question is how much is gained
by questioning or admission that would
aid in conviction over and above that
already gained from other sources of
evidence. If there is a witness to a
criminal event prior to questioning of
the arrested person by detectives at
2 David J. Bordua and Albert J. Reiss, Jr.,
"Sociology in Law Enforcement," in Paul F.
Lazarsfeld, William Sewell, and Harold Wilen-
sky (eds.), Uses of Sociology (New York:
Basic Books, 1967).
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the station, what is added through
interrogation?
THE OBSERVATION STUDY
The data for this paper were gathered
through direct observation by thirty-six
observers in high-crime-rate police pre-
cincts of Boston, Chicago, and Wash-
ington, D.C., during the summer of
1966.3 It should be emphasized that
the information pertains only to ques-
tioning of suspects by uniformed police
officers in encounters of field patrol.
To the degree that Miranda is strictly
interpreted as applying to in-custody
interrogations in a station house, the
data are not immediately relevant to
the frontal issue raised in that decision;
rather, they relate more to questions
concerning the extension of the Miranda
rule to field settings.4 4
Patrolmen are the first police to enter
most crime situations and hence the
first to have contact with any suspects
available in the immediate setting.
Typically, the police are mobilized to
handle incidents in one of two major
ways. The great majority of incidents
handled by patrolmen arise subsequent
to a citizen complaint by telephone fol-
lowed by a &dquo;dispatch&dquo; to the patrol car.
The second major way in which the
police become involved in incidents is
through &dquo;on-view&dquo; work-police inter-
vention in a field situation that occurs
at the officer’s discretion rather than in
response to a radioed command. The
&dquo;stop-and-frisk&dquo; is an example of an
on-view incident. The two types of
mobilization carry with them differen-
tial opportunities for discretionary action
and differential limiting conditions on
how the officer exercises his discretion.
Moreover, the way the police are
mobilized to deal with incidents affects
the kind of evidence they secure, and
hence the relative importance of ques-
tioning of suspects. The police must
link evidence to crimes and to violators.
Specifically, they must demonstrate that
a criminal or other violation has oc-
curred (evidence of a crime) and that
a particular person is liable for it (evi-
dence of guilt). Broadly speaking,
there are two major kinds of evidence
that can be offered in each case-oral
and physical. Most oral testimony is
by way of witnessing an event or ac-
knowledging participation in it.
Evidence of guilt is differentially
available depending upon the type of
mobilization in field settings. In on-
view encounters with suspects, the major
evidence of guilt lies in the testimony
of the officer as complainant and wit-
ness. Physical evidence such as a
weapon in the suspect’s possession,
stolen property, and the like usually
depends as well upon the officer’s testi-
mony that it was found in the crime
setting or on the suspect. Questioning
of the suspect and an admission from
him may add little to what is available
from the officer in on-view encounters.
Evidence of guilt in dispatched en-
counters of the police with suspects
usually rests upon the testimony of
3 See Donald J. Black and Albert J. Reiss,
Jr., "Patterns of Behavior in Police and Citi-
zen Transactions," in Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (ed.),
Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in
Major Metropolitan Areas, U.S. President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice Field Survey III
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967).
4 State v. Intogna, 419 P. 2d 59 (Arizona,
1966). The court explained "custodial inter-
rogation" to mean questioning when a person
"has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom in any significant
way." This definition was then applied to an
interrogation that occurred in a field setting,
with the conclusion that "a defendant ques-
tioned by an officer with a drawn gun within
three feet of him was deprived of his freedom
in a significant way." This case was tried
before Miranda, but the court followed the
interpretation of Escobedo given in Miranda
to rule on the admissibility of the defendant’s
admission. Intogna, then, represents an early
extension of Miranda to field settings.
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others who are witnesses to the event.
This arises from the simple fact that
the officer usually arrives after the of-
fense has occurred. Even when there is
some physical evidence lending weight
to the belief that a crime has occurred,
the officer has to rely on testimonial
evidence as to who is suspect. Without
a sworn complaint in such situations,
&dquo;probable cause&dquo; may not be satisfied.
Questioning of suspects and admission
thus may loom large as factors in
whether or not an officer arrests in
dispatched situations, particularly when
conflicting statements are made by com-
plainants and suspects. The role that
questioning plays in police work then
may depend to a great extent on how
the officer enters a situation and on




Patrolmen conduct interrogations in
only about one-third of their encounters
with suspects. The proportion is
roughly the same in dispatched situa-
tions and on-view situations. The fre-
quency with which patrol officers inter-
rogate is greater than that with which
they conduct personal and property
searches, as only one-fifth of the police-
suspect transactions included a search.
However, in almost one-third of the en-
counters where an interrogation took
place, a search of person, property, or
both also was conducted.
One characteristic of field interroga-
tions distinguishing them from those
conducted in an interrogation room at
a police station is that, not uncom-
monly, more than one suspect is ques-
tioned at the same time. In over one-
third of the interrogations observed, two
or more persons were questioned, and
in about one-fifth, three or more were
questioned. That the field interroga-
tion is so often a confrontation between
group and group places it somewhat at
odds with popular stereotypes of the
interrogation as an encounter between
one or more officers and a lone suspect.
In the absence of other patrol units
to lend assistance, the classic technique
of separating suspects for interrogation
is often unavailable to officers in a field
setting. The support and surveillance
given by his fellows may well mitigate
some of the suspect’s vulnerability in
such field confrontations.
Most field interrogations-about
three-fourths-took place only in a field
setting, usually on the street or in a
private place such as a dwelling. Nine
in ten included interrogation at the field
setting, some also involving questioning
during transportation to the police sta-
tion or at the station itself. Less than
5 per cent of the suspects were interro-
gated only at the station.
Not only did most occur far from an
interrogation room, but a substantial
majority involved temporary field de-
tention before the suspect was either
formally arrested or released. About
one-half of the suspects were detained
for less than ten minutes and three-
fourths for less than twenty minutes.
Nearly all of these persons were released
in the field setting. Over nine-tenths
of the suspects were detained less than
forty minutes; nevertheless, about 5 per
cent were detained an hour or more
before the police made a decision to
book or release.
There was a good deal of variety in
the content of the questions asked.
Field interrogations often have more to
do with ascertaining whether or not
someone night be criminally liable than
with extracting a self-incriminating
statement from a person already sus-
pected. Mere information-gathering
aimed at structuring the facts in the
situation is perhaps the major concern
of a patrolman entering a possible crime
situation. Detectives, by contrast, or-
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<linarily begin their investigation after
the preliminary structuring of the situa-
tion by patrol officers. Consequently,
about three-fourths of the interrogations
had as a manifest aim something other
than obtaining an oral admission of
guilt from the suspect. The questions
frequently concerned such matters as
what specifically occurred; the discre-
pancies in the versions of the parties
involved; whether or not, indeed, the
alleged incident occurred at all; and the
like. This is not to say, however, that
such seemingly innocuous probes rarely
elicit admissions or incriminating state-
ments. It is during this process that
suspects quite often make admissions
voluntarily.
INTERROGATION OF ADULT SUSPECTS
There were 248 encounters in which
an adult suspect was interrogated in a
field setting by the police. The type
of evidence available to the officer on
guilt of the suspect is clearly a function
of how the officer entered the setting.
Of the 248 encounters where an adult
suspect was questioned, 116 (47 per
cent) eventuated in an arrest; exactly
one-fourth of the arrests were made in
on-view settings. In 93 per cent of the
on-view arrests as contrasted with 42
per cent of the dispatched arrests, the
officer would have been able to offer
some testimony that a crime event took
place in his presence or that he had both
evidence and observation that the sus-
pect was definitely linked to the crime,
for example, the suspect had a stolen
car in his possession. The differences
are even greater considering the fact
that in 66 per cent of all on-view, as
compared with 24 per cent of all dis-
patched arrests, the only evidence avail-
able was the on-view testimony of the
officer that the offense occurred in his
presence.
Considering the interrogation situa-
tions where the officer did not make an
arrest, a similar pattern with sharper
contrast prevails. For 94 per cent of
the on-view encounters, the only evi-
dence available to the officer that the
suspect committed the crime would have
been his own testimony, while that was
true for only 11 per cent of all dis-
patched situations. Put another way,
in dispatched encounters, the officer
more often must rely upon evidence
from others to satisfy the criteria of a
legal arrest. Indeed, considering the
arrests for Part I offenses, when the
officer was dispatched, he had to rely
upon other evidence in 22 of 29 arrests
that were booked, whereas the officer
witnessed the three Part I on-view of-
fenses where there was an arrest and
booking.
While officers need to rely on other
evidence less often in Part II offenses
that are booked, the same pattern is
evident. Of 42 dispatched Part II
offenses booked, 15 S had to be made
solely on other evidence while for only
one of the 23 on-view bookings did the
officer have to rely upon other evidence.
Clearly, too, an officer is much less
likely to make an on-view arrest for a
felony than for a misdemeanor. But
three of the 32 bookings for Part I
offenses were on-view, whereas 23 of the
65 Part II bookings were on-views.
This difference undoubtedly arises from
the fact that felonies typically occur
in private, as contrasted with public,
places; hence felonies in progress are
not generally visible to the officer on
patrol. The police usually are mobil-
ized to a felony situation by a com-
plainant. Here is a case where the law
of arrest complements the empirical pat-
tern of the organization of crime. In
felony situations, the law requires only
&dquo;reasonable grounds&dquo; or &dquo;probable
cause&dquo; before a legal arrest is made,
whereas in misdemeanor situations there
generally is the &dquo;in-presence&dquo; or &dquo;war-
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rant&dquo; requirement for an arrest to be
made.
THE PRODUCTIVITY OF FIFLU
INTERROGATIONS
Recall that a rather broad definition
of interrogation was used in the field
observation study such that it was con-
sidered an interrogation when the officer
was directing his questioning toward
identifying elements of the crime and
assurances that it constituted a bona
fide arrest situation. Often he may not
have been attempting to elicit a self-
incriminating statement as an admission
of guilt or a confession per se. The
officer interrogated in 31 per cent of the
801 nontraffic encounters with adult
suspects. That interrogation was not
integral to making a field arrest and
booking is apparent from the fact that
in 54 per cent of the 198 Part I and
Part II bookings of adults there was no
interrogation. Correlatively, the officer
interrogated in 25 per cent of 603 non-
traffic encounters with adult suspects
where he did not eventually book a
suspect. Indeed, only 39 per cent of
all 248 interrogations for Part I and
Part II offenses led to a booking.
On the whole, the kind of interroga-
tion that the officer conducts in field
settings is relatively unproductive of
admissions. Of the 116 arrests (in-
cluding suspects never booked) that in-
cluded interrogation by officers, 91 (78
per cent) did not eventuate in admis-
sion. Of the 132 encounters where per-
sons were interrogated and not arrested,
121 1 (92 per cent) did not involve an
admission. About 86 per cent of all
encounters involving interrogation did
not result in an admission. This is
substantially below the figure reported
for in-station interrogations where about
50 per cent of all interrogated suspects
are reported to make an admission.6 I)
Considering only Part I crimes classi-
fied as felonies, the situation is not
substantially different. Among adult
suspects interrogated, there were 27 ar-
rests for felonies and 17 felonies where
there was no arrest. Somewhat more
than 80 per cent of the encounters with
felons did not result in an admission
when interrogation took place. Since
78 per cent of all interrogations of ar-
rested persons did not lead to an admis-
sion, there is almost no difference in
admissions among arrested persons de-
pending upon the seriousness of the
criminal charge. In encounters with
nonarrested persons, however, a some-
what greater per cent of encounters
with nonarrested felons (15 per cent)
than of all encounters with nonarrested
persons (8 per cent) resulted in an
admission. In any case, admission on
interrogation in field settings did not
make suspects substantially more liable
to arrest.
The kind of interrogation conducted
in field settings seems remarkably un-
productive of admissions of guilt. Of
all admissions in field situations, more
were made voluntarily prior to ques-
tioning than were made after question-
ing. Among encounters with arrested
persons, there were 25 admissions out
of 116 interrogations; 68 per cent of f
these were voluntary admissions before
questioning, and the questioning served
only to provide the officer with addi-
tional information or evidence. Among
those not arrested, there were only 11 1
admissions in 132 interrogations. Of
these, 45 per cent were voluntary. As-
suming that Miranda admits of volun-
5 A study by the Georgetown University
Law Center’s Institute of Criminal Law and
Procedure found that of the defendants ques-
tioned by the police, 34 per cent were inter-
rogated only at the time and place of arrest,
35 per cent at the police precinct, and 25 per
cent at both places. Of the suspects inter-
rogated, 45 per cent were reported by their
attorneys to have given statements. See
"Miranda Impact," Georgetown University
News Service, July 9, 1967.
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tary confessions under nearly all cir-
cumstances, questioning in field settings
is at least modestly productive of ad-
missions that clearly would be allowed
as evidence in court.’ , 6
A surprising fact is that admissions
after questioning are less productive of
arrest than are voluntary admissions in
field settings. Of the 22 voluntary ad-
missions before interrogation, 77 per
cent eventuated in arrest; of the 14
admissions after questioning, 57 per
cent resulted in arrest.
Among the 58 encounters with sus-
pected felons, six resulted in voluntary
admissions and three included admis-
sions after questioning. Five of the six,
including voluntary admissions, led to an
arrest, compared with one of the three
admissions after questioning. Though
the numbers are so small as to render
the comparison of doubtful value, vol-
untary admission seems more linked to
arrest than does admission following
interrogation.
INTERROGATIONS AND EVIDENCE
. It is difficult to determine how im-
portant interrogation is in producing
evidence that eventuates in conviction.
Given the fact that evidence is evalu-
ated at each step of a criminal proceed-
ing and not all of it enters the trial
proceeding nor judicial determination,
there is no a priori way of assessing
outcomes validly on the basis of evi-
dence. Indeed, given the high propor-
tion of pleas of guilt entered by the
defendant, the role of evidence itself
is moot in many proceedings. These
and other factors make it difficult to
determine how important interrogation
is in a pattern of evidence.
Nonetheless, certain questions can be
asked of the data that are relevant to
the general problem of the role of inter-
rogation in a pattern of evidence. One
such question concerns how often an
admission would be the only form of
evidence available. Each interrogation
involving a suspect was examined to
determine what evidence was available
to the patrol officer making the investi-
gation. While detailed information was
available on the kind of evidence,
a simple distinction was made as to
whether the evidence was available to
the officer by dint of his personal obser-
vation of the alleged offense or through
acquisition of physical evidence or tes-
timony by others. In some situations,
of course, both, or even all three kinds,
were available to the officer.
The striking pattern is that of the
fifty felonies committed by adults who
were subsequently interrogated, there
were only three instances where the
officer needed to rely upon interrogation
to secure evidence. None of these three
cases involved an arrest, however.
Further, the three interrogations where
there was no evidence failed to yield
admissions. All admissions therefore
were made when there was other evi-
dence or officer testimony as to occur-
rence of the event and the implication
of the suspect. This suggests that peo-
ple admit or confess when they are
aware that &dquo;the evidence is against
them.&dquo;
In three of the thirty felonies where
there was an arrest and booking, the
officer’s only evidence was his own ob-
servation. For six of the bookings, the
offense was observed by the officer and
there also was other evidence; in 21
bookings his case rested upon witnesses
or other evidence. In those eight ar-
6 During the observation period, the Miranda
warning rarely was given to suspects in field
settings. A citizen was apprised of at least
one of the rights specified in the Miranda
decision in 3 per cent of the police encounters
with suspects. In only three cases were all
four rights mentioned in Miranda used in the
warning. Even when suspects were apprised
of their rights, there is no evidence that they
were less likely to make admissions. See Black
and Reiss, op. cit., pp. 102-109.
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rests for felonies where the suspect was
released without booking, all involved
reliance upon other evidence, including
witnesses or complainants. Generally,
these are situations in which the com-
plainant refuses to sign a complaint
that could lead to effective prosecution
of the felony. For every felony.arrest,
then, whether the suspect was booked
or not, the officers would not have
needed to interrogate to offer evidence
in support of the arrest. While it could
be argued that, for the eight felony
suspects released without booking, an
admission could have substituted for
the failure of the complainant to sign a
complaint, none of these suspects made
an admission to the officer.
For the twenty felony situations
where no arrest was made, the officer
could have relied on his own testimony
in two cases and evidence from others
in fifteen cases. In only three cases
was he left essentially without evidence
in the field setting, and in each of these
the interrogation failed to yield an
admission.
It should be clear, then, that in the
large majority of cases where an officer
interrogates in a field setting following
an allegation about a felony, he does
have some basis for proceeding, apart
from any admission from the suspect,
whether or not he actually makes an
arrest.
CONCLUSION
The relative absence of formal pro-
vision for the resolution of conflict in
the American legal system results in
each organization’s controlling others
in the system through constraints on the
processing of people and information as
inputs to their own organization. This
paper has focused on the specific case
where the courts attempt to control the
behavior of law-enforcement officers
through the exclusionary rule, particu-
larly as set forth in the Miranda deci-
sion. The data presented relate to
arrest and interrogation of suspects in
field patrol settings, situations to which
Miranda potentially may be extended.
Furthermore, the data from field set-
tings are of relevance in that they relate
to the question of how necessary in-
custody interrogation is, given prior
processing of suspects in the field patrol
setting.
Unfortunately, no study has been
undertaken that views suspects in proc-
ess from the field setting where arrest
takes place, through processing in cus-
tody, public prosecution, and trial pro-
ceedings. In the absence of such gen-
eral processing studies, the relevance of
data on interrogations in field settings
for legal issues is debatable. Nonethe-
less, a few observations are offered,
addressed to the specific issues of
whether the liability of suspects to crimi-
nal charges is substantially reduced by
Mirandd warnings and whether the rate
of arrest, in turn, would be substan-
tially affected by their introduction into
field settings.
The data for this paper on interro-
gations of suspects in field patrol set-
tings show that arresting officers always
had evidence apart from the interroga-
tion itself as a basis for arrest. Indeed,
voluntary admissions were substantially
more frequent than were admissions fol-
lowing interrogation. For the most
part, however, interrogation was unpro-
ductive of admissions in . the field set-
ting. It would appear then that the
introduction of Miranda-type warnings
into field settings would have relatively
little effect on the liability of suspects
to criminal charges, particularly in fel-
ony cases-assuming current police be-
havior with respect to arrest.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to define
the point at which Miranda-type warn-
ings should be given in field settings.
Quite clearly, the officer in field patrol
must process information by questioning
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in field settings in order to define the
situation and the roles of participants
in it. At the very least, he must often
use questioning to define the roles of
complainant and suspected offender.
Conceivably, the introduction of such
warnings very early in the process of
contact with citizens could affect the
liability of suspects to criminal charges
adversely from the perspective of the
legal system.
The extension of warnings against
self-incrimination to field settings is
presumed to affect the rate of arrest
adversely. The general profile of police
work that emerges from this investiga-
tion, however, suggests that this argu-
ment is less forceful than many pre-
sume. The extent to which patrolmen
exercise their discretion not to invoke
the criminal process-even in felony
situations-when there is adequate evi-
dence for an arrest, raises a serious
question of whether this effect of the
discretionary decision on liability for
criminal charges is not greater than any
potential effect of Miranda warnings.
The extent to which the police exer-
cise discretion to arrest bears on the
issue of the consequences of procedural
restrictions in two ways. First, it makes
clear the fact that the volume of cases
which police generate as inputs for the
prosecutor and the courts is far from a
maximum, given contemporary police
practice. Second, their practices throw
into relief the degree to which the law-
enforcement system deviates from a
prosecution-oriented model to a com-
munity-oriented or behavioral-system-
oriented model of &dquo;justice.&dquo; The re-
lease of offenders at police discretion,
for whatever reason, renders ineffective
any control system based on limitation
of their outputs as inputs, as is the case
with the exclusionary rule.
A great deal of the conflict between
the police and the courts over interroga-
tion procedures may have less impact
on the police system than is generally
believed. Nevertheless, within the po-
lice system, its consequences may be
greater for detectives than for routine
patrol officers. This difference in con-
sequences may be directly related to the
greater organizational distance from
criminal violators at which detectives
do investigative work. In-station inter-
rogation, unlike routine patrol interro-
gation, is more prosecution-oriented;
hence, existing procedural restrictions
on interrogation may be more conse-
quential than would be an extension of
those restrictions.
